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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs Bremer, LLC and KGG Partnership (hereafter collectively referred to as 
"Bremer") extended a water main located within Hayden A venue to serve a manufacturing 
building Bremer had constructed off of Hayden Avenue. In the Complaint filed in this matter, 
Bremer claimed that the water main line extension it constructed to obtain water from East 
Greenacres Irrigation District ("EGID") constituted an illegal hook up fee because: (1) the 
extension was unrelated to the value of the system capacity used by Plaintiffs, and (2) the 
improvements were wholly unrelated to Plaintiffs' use of Defendant's irrigation system. (R., p. 
9). Contrary to its position below, on appeal Bremer concedes that irrigation districts may 
enter into a contract with the owner of a subdivided parcel for the construction by the 
landowner of a pressurized system for the proper distribution of irrigation water to the 
landowner's parcel pursuant to LC. §§43-330A-G (Appeal Brief, p. 9). On appeal, Bremer 
vacillates between claiming no construction agreement was reached between Bremer and 
EGID, and claiming that the construction agreement reached between EGID and Bremer was 
the result of economic duress exercised by EGID. 
Although Bremer advances the untenable position that a water main extension was not 
necessary to serve its new building, all the facts in the record are to the contrary. Even 
Bremer's own expert acknowledges the extension of the main line for water service was 
necessary to service Bremer's new industrial building. (R. p. 22A, 1.) 
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Bremer' s real grievance is that EGID did not pay for the construction of the water main 
extension, and later looped the extension to the benefit of all members of the irrigation district. 
Bremer contends because there was a benefit to all users by this action that EGID should have 
paid for and constructed the extension. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Bremer owns a subdivided parcel within EGID. Bremer requested EGID provide 
service to this parcel for a new manufacturing facility. EGID required Bremer submit a 
proposal for construction of improvements to EGID's system to achieve water service to 
Bremer's new facility. EGID granted approval for Bremer to construct the water main 
extension to Bremer's subdivided parcel for the purpose of serving Bremer's newly constructed 
manufacturing facility with water. Bremer alleged in its suit that the improvements it 
constructed were unrelated to Bremer's use of the property and amounted to an illegal hook up 
fee. Bremer sought damages in the amount expended for construction of the water main line 
extension, claiming it was an exaction, and therefore an illegal tax. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On March 4, 2011, Bremer filed a complaint against EGID. (R., p. 8.) EGID answered 
the complaint on June 1, 2011. (R., p. 2.) 
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On November 16, 2011, Bremer moved for partial summary judgment. (R., pp. 30-31.) 
Bremer filed a memorandum in support of the motion. (R., pp. 32-42.) Bremer filed affidavits 
from Phil Hart (R., pp. 20-23), Gary Bremer (R., pp. 24-26) and Brian Crumb (R., pp. 27-29) in 
supp01i of the motion. Defendant filed its opposition to Bremer' s summary judgment request 
on November 30, 2011. (R., pp. 173-186.) Bremer filed a reply memorandum in supp01i of its 
motion for summary judgment on December 8, 2012. (R., pp. 222-227.) 
On November 17, 2011, EGID filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. pp. 43-44.) 
EGID filed a memorandum in support of the motion. (R., pp. 45-55.) The supporting 
affidavits of Ron Wilson (R., pp. 56-134), Susan Weeks (R., pp. 135-142) and Jim Sappington 
(R., pp. 143-172) were filed November 17, 2011. Bremer filed its opposition to EGID's 
summary judgment motion on November 30, 2011. (R., pp. 187-190.) On December 1, 2011, 
EGID filed Bob Skelton's Affidavit. 1 (R., pp. 197-200.) On December 7, 2011, EGID filed its 
reply memorandum in support of its motion. (R., pp. 208-216.) 
On November 30, 2011, Bremer filed a motion to strike Ron Wilson's affidavit. (R., 
pp. 195-196.) A memorandum was filed in supp01i of the motion. (R., pp. 191-194.) On 
December 6, 2011, Bremer filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Jim Sappington. (R., pp. 
206-207.) A memorandum in support of the motion was also filed. (R., pp. 201-205.) 
On December 7, 2011, EGID filed its response to Bremer's motions to strike portions of 
the affidavit of Jim Sappington and to strike the affidavit of Ron Wilson. On December 8, 
2011, Bremer filed a supplemental motion to strike portions of the Affidavit of Jim Sappington 
1 The Affidavit referenced an attached Exhibit A, and indicated a full size copy would be provided to opposing 
counsel. One was not. More importantly, one was not provided to the trial court. 
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and the affidavit of Ron Wilson. (R., pp. 228-229.) On December 8, 2011, Bremer filed a 
motion to shorten time to hear its motion to strike the affidavit of Jim Sappington and 
Supplemental Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavits of Jim Sappington and Ron Wilson. 
(R. pp. 230-231.) Bremer filed a supporting memorandum for the supplemental motion to 
strike on December 8, 2011. (R., pp. 232-234.) 
On December 13, 2012, the motions for summary judgment proceeded to hearing, as 
well as the motions to strike, the subsequent motion to shorten time for the supplemental 
motion to strike, and the supplemental motion to strike. (R., p. 235.) The district court initially 
addressed the motions to strike and the supplemental motion to strike. The district court denied 
the motion to shorten time to hear the supplemental motion to strike. (Tr., Motions for 
Summary Judgment, p. 3, L. 2 - p. 7, L. 6.)2 The district court denied Bremer's original 
motions to strike. (Tr., Motions for Summary Judgment, p. 10, L. 3 - p. 12, L. 2; R., pp. 237-
238.) Following the hearing, the district court took the motions for summary judgment under 
advisement. (Tr., Motions for Summary Judgment, p. 35, Ll. 23-24.) On January 3, 2012, the 
Court entered its order denying Bremer's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavits of Jim 
Sappington and Ron Wilson. (R., p. 5.) 
On January 5, 2012, Bremer filed the Affidavit of Scott Jones.3 (R., pp. 239-240.) 
2 Respondent would typically provide a volume citation for the transcript. However, the Reporter's transcripts 
were not labeled by Volume, so the label of the Reporter's transcript is utilized herein to avoid confusion. 
3 Respondent believes that Mr. Jones' unverified affidavit was lodged with the Court pending obtaining the 
verified signature of Scott Jones. Respondent had agreed the affidavit could be lodged with the Court and 
considered by the Court if Plaintiff filed the verified complaint by the date of hearing. (R., p. 175.) However, 
EGTD does not object to the untimely filed affidavit on appeal. 
4 
On January 13, 2012, the district court issued its memorandum decision and order 
granting EGID's motion for summary judgment and denying Bremer's motion for partial 
summary judgment. (R., pp. 241-247.) On January 23, 2012, Bremer filed a motion for 
reconsideration. (R., pp. 248-249.) A memorandum in support of the motion to reconsider was 
filed at the same time. (R., pp. 250-253.) EGID filed a response to the motion on March 8, 
2012. (R., pp. 253-255.) On March 13, 2012, Bremer filed its response. (R., pp. 256-258.) 
The motion to reconsider was heard and denied by the trial court on March 14, 2012. The 
district court denied the motion for reconsideration. (R. p. 259.) 
On March 22, 2012, the district court entered judgment in EGID's favor and dismissed 
Bremer's suit. (R., pp. 260-261.) On March 23, 2012, the Court entered its order denying 
Bremer's motion for reconsideration. (R., p. 5.) 
On April 6, 2012, Bremer filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment and/or to set 
aside the judgment and to consider additional evidence. (R., pp. 262-263.) A supporting 
memorandum was filed with the motion. (R., pp. 264-268.) The affidavits of Gary Bremer (R., 
pp. 269-271) and Brent Schlotthauer (R., pp. 273-275) were filed in support of the motion. A 
memorandum opposing the motion was filed April 23, 2012. (R., pp. 276-281.) On April 26, 
2012, Bremer filed a reply memorandum in support of the motion. (R., pp. 282-285.) On April 
27, 2012, the district court heard the motion. The motion was denied. (R., p. 286.) The district 
court entered its order denying the motion on April 30, 2012. (R., p. 7.) 
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Bremer filed a Notice of Appeal on May 4, 2012. (R., pp. 287-292.) On May 22, 2012, 
an Amended Notice of Appeal was filed. (R., pp. 293-298.) A final judgment was entered by 
the District Court on June 1, 2012. (R., pp. 299-300.) 
C. Concise Statement of Facts 
On appeal, Bremer ignores most of the facts in the record in its Concise Statement of 
Facts, choosing only those that support its positions. Thus, EGID provides the following 
additional facts from the record. 
Bremer, LLC is an Idaho limited liability company. (R., p. 8.) KGG is an Idaho 
partnership. (R., p. 8.) 
East Greenacres Irrigation District ("EGID") is an Idaho irrigation district organized 
pursuant to Title 43, Idaho Code. The District operates a single pressurized irrigation system 
that delivers both iITigation and potable water to its members through its works. Tracts 6, 7, 8, 
9 and 10, Greenacres Plat No. 4, and the subsequent subdivisions of these tracts, lay within the 
boundaries of East Greenacres Irrigation District. (R., p. 56, ~ 1.) 
These tracts of land were subsequently subdivided. McGuire Industrial Park 
subdivision was recorded in Book J of Plats, Page 66 and 66A, Records of Kootenai County, 
Idaho on August 16, 2004 at the request of Double "B" Ranch and KGG Partnership. This plat 
subdivided Tracts 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Greenacres Plat No. 4. The plat contained a sanitary 
restriction imposed by Panhandle Health District. (R., pp. 137-138.) 
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On April 30, 2008, a re-plat of the McGuire Industrial Park, designated "McGuire 
Industrial Acres Subdivision," was recorded on April 30, 2008, in Book K of Plats, Page 144 
and 144A, Records of Kootenai County, Idaho at the request of Double "B" Ranch and KGG 
Partnership. This subdivision re-platted Lots 1 and 2 of the McGuire Industrial Park. The plat 
contained a sanitary restriction imposed by Panhandle Health District. 
This re-plat caused Lot 2 to have frontage on both McGuire Road and Hayden A venue, 
and made Lot 1 much smaller. (R., pp. 139-140.) Lot 2 became an irregularly shaped parcel 
containing approximately 10.675 acres. Bremer owned Lot 2. (R. p. 108.) 
A depiction of McGuire Industrial Acres from the record is contained in the following 
depiction from the record, showing Lot 2, bordered by Hayden A venue to the north of the lot, 
and McGuire Road lying to the west of the lot. (R. p. 139.) 
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On April 21, 2010, after construction of the irrigation extension that is the subject of 
this suit, Bremer Subdivision was recorded in Book K of Plats, Page 287 and 287 A, Records of 
Kootenai County, Idaho at the request of KGG Pa1inership. This subdivision divided Lot 2 into 
two lots, approximately five acres each. These lots were designated as Lots A and B, Block 1, 
Bremer subdivision. Lot A contained the area which fronted McGuire Road and Lot B 
contained the area which fronted Hayden Avenue. (R., pp. 141-142.) The lots were divided 
along the line shown within Lot 2 in the above depiction and designated "original lot line." 
Bremer owns FMl-EPS, which operates a foam insulation business in Post Falls, Idaho 
on some of the Lot 2 property owned by KGG Partnership. (R., p. 24, ~ 3.) In 2007, Bremer 
constructed a new building for use by FMI-EPC, LLC on Lot 2. (R., p. 25, ~r 5.) There was no 
water service installed to this building as the building did not exist at that time. (R., p. 57, ~ 4; 
p. 143, ~ 3.) Kootenai County Fire & Rescue required that the building be serviced by two fire 
hydrants, one on each side of the building, and required that the building include a fire sprinkler 
system. (R., p. 144, ~ 5.) 
On March 4, 2008, a representative for Bremer, LLC, Jim Nirk, appeared before the 
District Board and verbally informed the Board and District Manager Ron Wilson that Gary 
Bremer needed approval of a connection to the District's water system for new construction 
related to Foam Molders for that portion of Lot 2 that fronted Hayden Avenue. The District 
informed Mr. Nirk that engineered plans and DEQ approval for construction were needed 
before the District would grant conceptual approval of plans. (R., p. 57, ~ 2.) 
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On March 18, 2008, Wilson met with Gary Bremer regarding extension of the water 
main on Hayden Avenue to accommodate a new industrial facility for Foam Molders. (R., p. 
57, ~ 3.) Following the meeting, Bremer contacted his attorney because he felt the main water 
extension had nothing to do with his company's hook-up. Bremer's attorney negotiated on his 
behalf, but in Bremer's view did not make any progress. (R., p. 25.) Bremer testified he would 
have incurred costs of approximately $6,000 per day ifhe did not move forward with the water 
main extension. (R., p. 25, ~ 9.) · The source of these costs was not included in the record. 
Bremer retained engineer Scott Jones to design the mainline extension to service the building 
and the site to EGID's system. (R., p. 25, ~ 6.) 
On April 3, 2008, Panhandle Health District wrote to Emmett Burley regarding the 
McGuire Industrial Acres re-plat indicating it would grant plat approval when the District 
issued a "will serve" letter committing to water to both lots 1 and 2 of the re-plat. (R., 
p. 58, ~ 6; pp. 62-63, exhibit A.) 
On Apiil 17, 2008, the District forwarded Panhandle Health District a previous will 
serve letter from April 10, 2006 issued in connection with the first subdivision, McGuire 
Industrial Park, and inquired if it satisfied Panhandle Health District's will serve letter 
requirement. This previous letter indicated a water main line extension was required along 
Hayden A venue in order to serve the subdivision that was proposed by Emmett Burley. (R., p. 
58, ~ 7; pp. 64-67, exhibit B.) 
On May 2, 2008, Jones was provided the District's standard application for conceptual 
review of a project. (R., p. 58, if 8; pp. 68-72, exhibit C.) On May 5, 2008, Jones submitted 
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engineered plans to Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) for the water main 
extension project. On the same date, Jones submitted the engineered plans to EGID. (R., p. 58, 
irn 9 and 1 O; pp. 73-76, exhibits D and E.) 
On May 6, 2008, EGID's Board of Directors granted conceptual approval for the 
extension of the Hayden A venue water main to Bremer' s parcel. (R., p. 58, i; 11.) By letter 
dated May 7, 2008, Jones was informed by EGID of the approval. (R., p. 58, ~ 12; exhibit F, 
pp. 77-78.) On May 13, 2008, EGID issued a will serve letter to DEQ indicating that an 
extension of the water main in Hayden Avenue was being proposed to serve the parcel. (R., p. 
58, ~ 13; pp. 79-80, exhibit G.) 
On May 16, 2008, the water main extension construction plan was submitted to DEQ by 
Jones. (R., p. 58, ~ 14; pp. 81-82, exhibit H.) By letter dated June 17, 2008, DEQ wrote to 
KGG Pminership disapproving the proposed Hayden A venue water main extension project, 
which consisted of construction of approximately 800 feet of 8-inch PVC water main in 
Hayden A venue, as well as an 8-inch dedicated fire supply line to serve the parcel. DEQ 
indicated the project appeared to be an extension of a previously approved water main 
extension on Hayden Avenue issued to Emmett Burley on November 28, 2007. DEQ noted 
that Burley had not finalized his project with DEQ and that DEQ needed the record drawings. 
DEQ also informed Bremer that the design engineer had to demonstrate that the plan the 
engineer proposed was capable of meeting minimum fire flow requirements. (R., p. 58, ~ 15; 
pp. 83-34, exhibit I.) 
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By letter dated June 27, 2008, DEQ informed KGG Partnership that it had received a 
letter from the local fire authority stating the local fire authority had received evidence that the 
required fire flows were met by Jones' plan. Based upon this information from the local fire 
authority, DEQ withdrew its disapproval of the project and approved the plans for construction. 
(R., p. 59, iJ 16; exhibit J, pp. 85-86.) 
EGID requires fire hydrants be located in a public right of way. (R., p. 144, if 6.) At the 
time the building was being constructed, EGID's water main dead ended on Hayden Avenue at 
Emmett Burley's parcel immediately west of the Bremer parcel. (R., p. 144, if 7.) In order to 
obtain service from EGID for the Bremer parcel, including the fire hydrants and sprinkler 
system required by Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, it was necessary to extend the existing 8" 
water main in Hayden Avenue east to the Bremer parcel. (Id.) Bremer extended the water 
main approximately 800 lineal feet to service the new building.4 (R., p. 144, if 8.) 
By letter dated September 19, 2008, Jones submitted as-built project plans (engineered 
drawings showing construction components of the works as actually constructed) for both 
Burley and Bremer to EGID, along with a request that EGID forward an approved copy to 
DEQ. The as-builts showed the water main had been extended along Hayden A venue, two fire 
hydrants had been installed in the public right of way, and a dedicated fire sprinkler line \Vas 
connected to the main to service the new factory building. (R., p. 59, if 17; pp. 87-90, exhibit 
K.) Bremer paid approximately $48,340.00 for the construction of the water main line 
extension. (R., p. 25, if 10.) Brian Crumb, the owner of Copper Creek Environmental Land 
4 In his affidavit, Bremer contradicts his engineer's plans and claims he extended the water main 1,500 feet. 
However, this disputed fact is not material. 
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Clearing, LLC, testified that it would cost another $56,820.00 to reclaim the north side of 
Bremer's property adjacent to Hayden Avenue. (R., pp. 27-29.) 
By letter dated September 19, 2008, EGID provided Jones with its pressure tests of the 
new line extension that served the new construction, which indicated the line had passed 
pressure test requirements. (R., p. 59, ~· 18; pp. 91-97, exhibit L.) On September 26, 2008, the 
District informed DEQ that it approved the construction as a continuation of the 2007 Burley 
water main extension. (R., p. 59, ~ 19; pp. 98-99, exhibit M.) 
On October 31, 2008, Foam Molders paid a domestic connection fee of $2,250 and an 
irrigation connection fee of $600 (for a total of $2,850) to connect to the pressurized water 
system. (R., p. 59, ~ 20.) This fee was not challenged in the litigation. 
By letter dated December 11, 2008, DEQ informed EGID that all requirements under 
the Idaho Rules for Public Drinking Water Systems were completed. (R., p. 59, ~ 21, pp. 100-
101, exhibit N.) 
By letter dated July 22, 2009, EGID received notice from Empire Surveying and 
Consulting, Inc. that Gary Bremer was applying to subdivide Lot 2 of McGuire Industrial 
Acres. Bremer requested a will serve letter for the new parcel being created, and an affirmative 
statement from EGID that no water main extensions would be required to serve the subdivision 
given the previous water main extension in Hayden A venue. (R., p. 59, ~ 22; pp. 102-104, 
exhibit 0.) On August 7, 2011, EGID responded that given the previous water main extension 
in Hayden A venue, no further extension was necessary to serve the subdivided parcel. (R., p. 
59,f ;pp.105-106,exhibitP.) 
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On September 1, 2009, EGID received a letter from Kootenai County notifying it that 
KGG Partnership was subdividing Lot 2, Block 1 of McGuire Industrial Acres into two (2) lots 
and requesting comments from EGID. (R., p. 108.) The cover letter indicated that both 
proposed lots were developed with Lot A having access from McGuire Road and proposed Lot 
B having access from Hayden A venue, and that EGID was serving both proposed lots. (R., p. 
108.) The narrative supplied with the application indicated that domestic water to both lots was 
being supplied by EGID, and all water lines had been installed to serve the existing buildings 
on proposed Lots A and B. (R., p. 114.) The footprints of the two existing buildings were 
depicted in the subdivision materials and showed one building on each proposed lot. (R., p. 
116.) Included in the county packet were the District's May 13, 2008 will serve letter, the 
District's September 26, 2008 approval of the constructed water main extension along Hayden 
A venue, and the District's August 7, 2009 letter that no water main extension was required for 
service to the newly subdivided parcel given the previous extension. (R., p. 59, ~ 24; pp, 107-
128, exhibit Q.) By letter dated September 2, 2009, Panhandle Health District sought an 
affirmation from EGID that the subdivision would be served from an existing water main and 
required no extensions of the water main. (R., pp. 129-130.) Had the previous water main 
extension not been completed, EGID vmuld have commented that each lot would be required to 
have its own service connection and meters, and an extension of the water main in Hayden 
Avenue to serve Lot B would be required. (R., p. 60, ~ 27.) On April 2010, EGID provided 
John Monaco, Bremer's engineer, a will serve letter for the new subdivision. (R., p. 134). 
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Approximately two and one-half (2 112) years after the Hayden A venue water main 
extension was completed by Bremer, EGID extended the Hayden A venue water main to 
connect to another main line within the water system, which is known as "looping" the line. 
EGID paid for this extension and did all the related work for the extension. (R., p. 144, if 10.) 
According to Bremer' s expert, water districts attempt to loop their systems whenever possible. 
(R., p. 22A, 1 4.) Bremer's expelt testified that a looped configuration tends to equalize 
pressure within the entire system and generally provides increased flows at any point within the 
looped system. Looping provides a benefit to the entire water system and its users. (R., p. 
~· 5.) Bremer did not bear the cost of the Hayden A venue water main extension to loop 
the line. (R. p. 145, 1 10.) The line was looped to better serve all members of the district, 
including Bremer. (R., p. 145, if 10.) 
Bremer' s expert, Philip Hart, provided an expe1t opinion of his assessment of the water 
line required by EGID. Hart's assessment was that the building needed to utilize EGID's 
service, and that the water main was extended 1,500 feet for this service. (R., p. 22A, «Jl.) Hart 
commented that he was informed by Gary Bremer that Bremer's building was placed on a lot 
next to an existing building which already had service. (R., p, 22A, ,3.) No explanation was 
given why this observation was relevant to Hart's assessment. (R., p. 20-23.) 
Jones also submitted an expert affidavit indicating he was hired to engineer the 
connection to EGID's system. (R. p. 239, ~3.) Jones testified EGID told him he would be 
required to extend the [Hayden Avenue] main line across Bremer's property. (R., p. 239,, 4.) 
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Jones testified he gained the understanding that EGID wanted the line 
plan to loop the line. (R., p. 240.) 
In its concise statement of facts, Bremer indicates that Bremer's contiguous property 
was already provided service by EGID, and the existing water main could have been extended 
to provide service to the new property from that contiguous property. EGID disagrees with this 
characterization of the facts. 
EGID addressed Hart's affidavit and provided some explanation to the Court regarding 
Hart's comment that there was an adjacent building with service adjacent to McGuire Road. 
EGID testified if this testimony was presented by Hart to infer that a water main branch off the 
McGuire water main could be installed and routed across and through Bremer's private 
property, such an inference was not correct. EGID testified it disfavors routing water main line 
extensions through private property and promotes routing main line extensions within public 
rights of way for several reasons. When main water lines are contained within private property, 
future system additions and expansions of the water main can require acquisition of easements 
through private property. (R., p. 146, ii 11.) Routing water mains through private property 
potentially leads to encroachment issues at a later date. (R., p. 146, ,.. 11.) It is less expensive 
and simpler to operate and maintain main lines that lie within public rights of way. (R., p. 146, 
,.. 11.) Further, EGID has a policy that water main extensions must provide for the proper 
present and future circulation of water. Water mains that dead-end at the back of private 
properties do not meet this policy. (R., p. 146, if 11.) 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court reiterated the standard of review for a matter scheduled for court trial in its 
recent decision issued in the case of Kootenai County v. Harriman-Sayler,_ Idaho P.3d 
_ (20 l 2 Opinion No. 151 ), holding that: 
Id. 
This Court conducts a de nova review of a district court's grant of summary 
judgment, using the standard the trial court used in ruling on the motion. Taylor v. 
McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832, 243 P.3d 642, 648 (2010) (quoting Curlee v. 
Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394, 224 P.3d 458, 461 (2008)). 
Therefore, the Comt affirms a grant of summary judgment when "the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P. 56( c ). "When there is no question of 
material fact, only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free 
review." Youngblood v. Higbee, 145 Idaho 665, 668, 182 P.3d 1199, 1202 (2008) 
(citing Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 227, 159 P.3d 862, 864 (2007)). Under this 
standard, "disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving pa1ty, and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the 
non-moving party." Stonebrook Const., LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 152 Idaho 
927, 929, 277 P.3d 374, 376 (2012) (quoting Curlee, 148 Idaho at 394, 224 P.3d at 
461). 
With respect to the standard of review when statutory construction is involved, this Court 
set forth the standard of review in Kootenai County v. Harriman-Saylor, Idaho _, _ P.3d 
(2012 Opinion No. 151) when it held that: 
"Interpretation of an ordinance or statute is a question of law over which this Com1 
exercises free review." Lane Ranch P 'ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 89, 
175 P.3d 776, 778 (2007) (citing Friends of Farm to kfarket v. Valley Cnty., 137 
Idaho 192, 196, 46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002)). "We apply the same principles in construing 
municipal ordinances as we do in the construction of statutes." Friends of Farm to 
l'vfkt., 137 Idaho at 197, 46 P.3d at 14 (quoting Cunningham v. City a/Twin Falls, 
16 
Id. 
125 Idaho 776, 779, 874 P.2d 587, 590 (Ct.App.1994)). 
B. The District Court did not Err in Granting EGID's Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
1. The District Court did not err in holding an agreement was reached 
between EGID and Bremer even though it was not written. 
In its memorandum decision in this matter, the district comi found that I.C. § 43-330A 
allowed an irrigation district and an owner of a subdivided parcel to enter into a contract for the 
construction of a pressurized system for the prope1iy distribution of irrigation water to the 
parcel. (R., p. 245.) The district court noted the Idaho Legislature intended that irrigation 
districts have the power to require landowners who subdivide to pay for the costs of extending 
the pressurized water system to the improved land. (R., p. 245.) 
Idaho Code provides two mechanisms for an individual to obtain an extension of an 
irrigation district's system to service a parcel. The first mechanism is encompassed within I.C. 
§§ 43-328-330, and requires the holder of title of prope1iy within the district to petition the 
board of directors for construction of any improvement for the efficient irrigation of lands 
within the district. If this route is taken, and the Board approves the petition, an election is 
held, and the benefited parcel is assessed the cost of the improvement. 
In the event the land is subdivided land within the District, a contract may be entered 
into with the owner of the parcel proposed for development. Idaho Code § 43-330A provides: 
When a parcel of land lying within an irrigation district has been 
subdivided and the owner or owners of the entire parcel propose to develop that 
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parcel or any of the tracts therein for residential, commercial, industrial or 
municipal use, the board of directors of the district may enter into a contract 
with the owner or owners of the entire parcel, or of any tract therein, for the 
construction of a pressurized system for the proper distribution of irrigation 
water to the parcel or to the designated tracts within the parcel. 
The agreement reached in this matter was that Bremer would be responsible for construction of 
the improvements to serve the parcel, and EGID would serve the deliver water to Bremer's 
facility. 
However, LC. § 40-330D indicates the contract is to be recorded, and until it is recorded, 
the landowner remains liable for the cost of construction. It appears the legislature contemplated 
the agreement would be placed in writing and recorded to secure payment to the district for costs 
expended. The district court found EGID did not comply with this portion of the statute, but that 
such non-compliance did not invalidate the agreement. 
Bremer maintains that the failure to comply with l.C. §40-33D invalidates the agreement. 
Bremer presents no legal authority in support of this argument. Contracts for the construction of 
irrigation works are not one of the categories of contracts that are invalid unless placed in writing 
pursuant to Idaho's statutes of fraud, I.C. § 9-505. 
It is clear from the provisions of LC. §40-330A-G that the requirements that the recording 
of the contract was to secure payment to the irrigation district of the improvements. It was also 
intended to allocate the cost of construction to the benefitted parcels over time. Thus, the district 
court did not err in finding that this omission by EGID was not fatal to the claim that the parties 
reached an agreement as allowed tmder LC. §40-330. 
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2. There was no question of fact regarding business compulsion that 
precluded summary judgment. 
The district court concluded from the facts before it that Bremer and EGID reached an 
agreement whereby Bremer was responsible for construction of the system improvements to 
serve its parcel. (R., p. 245.) It is this holding Bremer challenges on appeal. Bremer contends 
there was no agreement because his acquiescence was coerced. 
As a point of clarification before moving to the substance of Bremer's arguments, it 
should be noted that Bremer did not pay EGID for construction of the water main extension. 
Instead, Bremer constructed the water main extension at its own cost utilizing plans developed 
by Bremer's engineer, which were approved by EGID. 
Bremer' s assertion on appeal that EGID did not raise the voluntary payment rule on 
summary judgment is correct. Under the voluntary payment rule, a person may not, by way of 
set-off, counterclaim, or direct action, recover money that he or she voluntarily paid with full 
knowledge of all the facts and without any fraud, duress or extortion, although no obligation to 
make such payment existed. Medical Recovery Servs., LLC v. Carnes, 148 Idaho 868, 871, 230 
P.3d 760, 763 (Ct. App. 2010). Since Bremer made no payment to EGID that was challenged 
in the suit, this affirmative defense is inapplicable to the present case and was not raised by 
EGID in any of its pleadings. 
Bremer tries to manufacture a question of fact regarding the voluntary payment rule by 
claiming the district court sua sponte raised the voluntary payment rule at the hearing on 
Bremer' s Motion to Reconsider. Bremer claims because the district court uttered the phrase 
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"was acceded to by the plaintiffs" that the district court was abandoning its written 
memorandum decision and holding that summary judgment was proper under the voluntary 
payment rnle. This argument is disingenuous and disregards the context of the entire hearing. 
Bremer opened at the reconsideration hearing by arguing reconsideration was 
appropriate because there was a question of fact whether the subdivision required the extension 
to the Hayden A venue water main in order to provide proper distribution of water to the 
subdivision. (Tr., Motion for Reconsideration, p. 4, LL 8-23.) EGID responded that the 
undisputed evidence before the court was that Bremer, through its representative, approached 
EGID about obtaining water for its new manufacturing facility. EGID responded that it would 
provide water, but Bremer had to provide an engineered proposal showing how it would 
connect the building to EGID's water system. Bremer's engineer provided an engineered 
proposal to achieve Bremer's objective, and therefore it represented a plan for the proper 
distribution of water. EGID argued that these facts fell within KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 
138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003); that there was a meeting of the minds and agreement on 
Bremer constructing a water main extension along Hayden Avenue. EGID argued Bremer 
could not come in after performance and argue there was no meeting of the minds on a term it 
supplied (i.e., the Hayden Avenue line extension proposal provided for the proper distribution 
of water). (Tr., Motion for Reconsideration, p. 4, L. 25 p. 6, L. 15.) In reply, Bremer 
objected to the application of KA1ST, supra, to the present case. Bremer argued it was coerced 
into submitting the line extension routing proposal because it would have lost money if it didn't 
acquiesce to EGID's desires. Bremer argued there was a question of fact whether it was 
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coerced by EGID. Bremer maintained it wanted to construct the water main line along the back 
of its properties. (Tr., Motion for Reconsideration, p. 6, L. 17 - p. 8, L. 5.) 
The district court ruled on the motion at the hearing. The district court stated that it 
recognized it was governed by LR.C.P. 11 and the issue was a matter of discretion. The district 
court noted, although not required, that there were no new facts presented or new theories of 
law. The district court then held that it was paraphrasing its initial decision and affinning it, 
indicating that it believed that Bremer submitted the plans to EGID for extending the main line, 
the plan was accepted, and that plan was finalized. (Tr., Motion for Reconsideration, p. 8, L. 6 
-p. 10, L. 17.) 
The district court concluded its ruling by stating: 
Instead, the record seems to this court to be clear that plaintiffs responded with 
here's our plan for extending the main line, and that plan was finalized. The 
water - the job was done, and so therefore this court finds there to be no issues 
of material fact as to whether this was a proper action by the defendant because 
the action was acceded to by the plaintiffs, and therefore no cause of action lies 
at this point, and summary judgment as a matter of law was appropriate for the 
defense, so with that, the Court denies the motion for reconsideration and asks 
defense to prepare an order for the Court and a proposed judgment to finalize 
this matter. 
(Tr., Motion for Reconsideration, p. 10, LL 5-17.) 
Nothing in the above pronunciation by the district court indicates that the district court sua 
sponte raised the voluntary payment rule as an alternate ground for its previous decision and 
order granting summary judgment. Further, nothing indicates that the district court was 
changing its written memorandum decision. To the contrary, the district court specifically 
indicated it was paraphrasing its earlier decision. 
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Nonetheless, Bremer continues to argue there was a question of fact regarding coercion 
that precluded a grant of summary judgment. Taking this argument out of the context of the 
voluntary payment rule, and placing it within the context of a contract, the issue becomes 
whether there was a question of fact regarding economic duress or business compulsion raised 
by Bremer that precluded summary judgment. In Country Cove Development, Inc., v. May, 143 
Idaho 595, 150 P.3d 288 (2006), this Court held: 
Id. 
In Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Tiger Enters., 99 Idaho 539, 542, 585 P.2d 
949, 952 (1978) (quoting WR. Grimshaw Co. v. Nevil C. Withrow Co., 248 F.2d 
896, 904 (8th Cir. 1957), the Court declared that an actionable claim of duress 
requires three elements: "(l) that one side involuntarily accepted the terms of 
another; (2) that circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) that said 
circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite party." Mere 
reluctance to accept is not sufficient to constitute duress; the party claiming 
duress must show that there was no reasonable alternative. Id. Moreover, that 
party must prove causation, that that "the duress resulted from [the other 
party's] wrongful and oppressive conduct" rather than from the party's own 
necessities. Id. This Court stated in Inland Empire Refineries, Inc. v. Jones, 
"[g]enerally, the demand by one party must be \Nrongful or unlawful, and the 
paiiy must have no other means of immediate relief from the actual or 
threatened duress other than by compliance with the demand." 69 Idaho 335, 
339-40, 206 P.2d 519, (1949) (citations omitted). 
Gary Bremer testified in his affidavit he needed water from EGID, he retained Scott 
improvements would ultimately require Bremer to expend approximately $80,000 to construct, 
and he believed the Hayden A venue water main extension had nothing to do with his 
company's hook-up to the water main. (R., p. 25.) Mr. Bremer indicated that he hired an 
attorney to negotiate on his behalf with EGID, but his attorney "could not make any progress." 
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(E., p. 25, ~ 8.) Mr. Bremer testified his company would have incuned costs of approximately 
$6,000 per day if he did not move forward with the Hayden A venue water main, so he was 
coerced into installing the line. (R., p. 25, 9.) The source of these alleged costs are not 
contained in the record. However, the inference Bremer believes the district court should have 
drawn from this testimony is that he was economically coerced into entering into the agreement 
to construct the Hayden Avenue water main, and therefore summary judgment for EGID was 
improper. Bremer never raised this defense in his response to EGID 's motion for summary 
judgment. He did raise economic coercion in his motion to alter or amend the judgment, which 
motion was denied, and is addressed later in this brief. Had the motion been granted, the 
district court would have considered the testimony of attorney Brent Schlotthaur that 
Schlotthaur met with Bremer and discussed the matter. Schlotthaur also met with EGID's 
district manager, who was unable to enunciate EGID's legal authority and refened him to 
EGID's bylaws. Schlotthauer testified that Bremer's company could not use the facility it had 
just constructed without water from EGID. Schlotthaur testified he informed Bremer that even 
though EGID's requirement that Bremer construct the improvement was illegal, it would take a 
lot of time to litigate. Schlotthaur advised Bremer the delay caused by litigation would 
intenupt Bremer's business and cost it money if the litigation were instituted against EGID 
before connecting to EGID's system. (R., pp. 273-274.) 
Several decisions have addressed the second prong of the business compulsion defense. 
In Inland Empire Refineries, Inc. v. Jones, 69 Idaho 335, 339-40, 206 P.2d 519, 522 (1949), 
this Court held "Business compulsion is not established merely by proof that consent is secured 
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by pressure of financial circumstances; or that one party insisted upon a legal right and the 
other party yielded to such insistence." Id. Later, in Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Tiger Enters., 
99 Idaho 539, 542, 585 P.2d 949, 952 (1978) the court expanded on this concept, holding: 
Id. 
Business compulsion is not established merely by proof that consent is secured 
by pressure of financial circumstances; or that one party insisted upon a legal 
right and the other party yielded to such insistence. Neither will a mere threat to 
withhold from a party a legal right which he has an adequate remedy to enforce, 
constitute duress. Generally, the demand by one party must be wrongful or 
unlawful, and the other party must have no other means of immediate relief from 
the actual or threatened duress than by compliance with the demand. (citations 
omitted.) 
Pursuant to LC. 40-330A, EGID had the right to reqmre Bremer to construct the 
improvements to serve its parcel. Therefore, there was no unlawful demand or wrongful act by 
EGID. Further, financial pressures do not constitute business compulsion. Thus, even had the 
district court granted the motion to alter or amend pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b) as requested by 
Bremer, there was no evidence of business compulsion. 
Further, this case fits within the principals expressed in KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 
138 Idaho 577, 581, 67 P.3d 56, 60 (2003). This Court specifically rejected a similar 
development tactic. KMST proposed a dedication of a road and construction of the road to 
obtain approval of a subdivision, knowing that Ada County Highway District staff would 
recommend it to the Board. After approval and completion of the subdivision, KMST sued the 
highway district, claiming the highway district had taken its property without compensation 
because the road was a system improvement, and therefore an exaction. This Court rejected 
this argument, noting that the decision to dedicate land for the road and to build the road was 
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included in the application and was done to expedite the project, and having voluntarily made 
the decision to dedicate and improve the street to speed approval of its development, KMST 
could not come back and claim its property was taken. 
The same principles are present in this case. Bremer presented a plan of construction to 
EGID to obtain service to its subdivided parcel. EGID accepted the proposal for extending its 
irrigation system. Now Bremer claims the extension it proposed was not necessary for Bremer 
to acquire water. Under the KMSTholding, Bremer is precluded from making such a claim. 
3. There were no questions of fact regarding the routing of the line that 
precluded summary judgment. 
The multitude of undisputed facts set forth herein establish that EGID's iITigation 
system did not extend to the manufacturing facility Bremer was constructing, and Bremer 
needed to have the irrigation system extended to provide water. It is undisputed that Bremer' s 
agent approached EGID and inquired into extending EGID's irrigation system to deliver water 
to Bremer's facility. It is undisputed that EGID directed Bremer's agent to provide EGID with 
an engineered proposal for delivery of water from EGID's system to Bremer. There is no 
dispute that Bremer's engineer, Scott Jones, provided plans to the District DEQ for approval of 
a proposed Hayden Avenue water main extension to deliver water to Bremer's new 
manufacturing facility, including its fire flow needs. 
There is no dispute that all agencies that received the plans approved them as being 
appropriate to meet the agency's requirements regarding water delivery for the parcel. Initially, 
DEQ disapproved the engineered plans, noting that the design engineer needed to demonstrate 
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that the conceptual water system design was capable of meeting minimum fire flow 
requirements. Later, DEQ informed Bremer that the local fire authority had affirmed that the 
plans met minimum fire flow requirements. DEQ then approved the construction plans, as did 
the District. As the district court found in its memorandum decision, it is undisputed that 
Bremer's engineer requested EGID's standards and engineered a plan to achieve Bremer's 
objective of obtaining water from EGID's system. These plans also satisfied the requirements 
of all other involved agencies. 
Despite this whole host of undisputed facts, Bremer maintains there is a question of fact 
whether a water main extension was necessary to service the parcel based upon the affidavits of 
Scott Jones and Bob Skelton. Bremer also claims there is a question of fact whether the routing 
of the main line along Hayden A venue provided for the proper distribution of water to 
Bremer's parcel. 
Bremer claims that Skelton testified in his affidavit that a water main extension was not 
necessary to meet the fire flow needs of the facility, and therefore summary judgment was not 
appropriate because there was a question of fact whether the system provided for the proper 
distribution of water. Bremer overstates Skelton's affidavit testimony. Skelton testified that 
his protection plan did not require a main line extension to provide for proper flow. (R. 
p. 198, .- 6.) Skelton also testified that the hydrant fire flows provided to him by the local fire 
district showed adequate fire flow for the facility. (R., p. 198, •1~ 5-6.) Skelton does not testify 
that the extension engineered by Jones was unnecessary. Since Bremer chose not to include the 
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fire protection plan for the district court's review in the summary judgment proceeding, it is 
impossible to know if it addressed anything outside the building. 
Further, Skelton testified the fire flow he utilized in his design was based upon the fire 
hydrant flow information he obtained from the local fire district. (R., p. 198, ~ 4.) As 
previously noted, Jones was required by DEQ following disapproval of his engineered plans to 
demonstrate to the local fire district that his design, which included two fire hydrants, would 
meet minimum fire flow requirements. (R., p. 84.) The local fire district reviewed Jones' plans 
and determined the proposed Hayden A venue main line extension, including the two fire 
hydrants, met the requirements for minimum fire flow. (R., p. 86.) Thus, Skelton indirectly 
relied upon Jones' water main extension plan because Skelton relied upon the local fire 
district's information that the fire hydrants would meet minimum fire flow requirements. The 
local fire district's information was predicated on Jones' plan. 
While Skelton' s affidavit is technically correct, it ignores how the fire suppression 
system designed by Skelton for the building was intended to obtain water. The answer to that 
question lies in Jones' plan submittal and as-builts. Jones' design included an 8" PVC 
dedicated fire sprinkler supply pipeline from EGID's Hayden Avenue water main to the 
building to operate the fire suppression system designed by Advanced Fire Systems, Inc. Thus, 
even though Skelton's design may not have included a mainline extension, the engineer hired 
by Bremer and assigned the task of actually presenting an engineered plan to the District, DEQ 
and Kootenai County Fire & Rescue to meet all agency requirements included a mainline 
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extension along Hayden A venue, with an 8" dedicated fire sprinkler line branching to the 
building as the option to accomplish the task at hand. 
The most salient fact in the record that the Hayden A venue water main extension 
provided for the proper distribution of water to Bremer's parcel is that it was designed by 
Bremer's own engineer as the proposal that best suited Bremer's desire to obtain water from 
EGID, and met the requirements of DEQ and Kootenai County Fire & Rescue. Bremer argues 
that this Court should disregard this fact because Jones testified that he "gained an 
understanding" that EGID wanted the Hayden Avenue water main line extended "incident to" 
its plan to loop the line. (R. p, 240, 15.) Jones did not testify that the water main extension was 
not required to serve Bremer's parcel. He did not testify that his engineered plans were 
inappropriate or unnecessary to Bremer's desire to obtain water from EGID. He did not even 
testify that he had an alternative proposal through Bremer's adjacent property that would have 
better served Bremer' s needs for service of water. Rather, he testified that he understood at 
some point EGID wanted to loop the Hayden A venue water main. 
Bremer claims because EGID extended the Hayden A venue water main line 2 Yz years 
later and looped it for the benefit of all water users, it creates a question of fact whether the 
water main extension was necessary to provide proper service to Bremer's parcel. Jim 
Sappington, Superintendent of Maintenance and Operations for EGID, testified in his affidavit 
that EGID attempts to loop lines whenever feasible, but the extension was not required by 
EGID for the purpose of facilitating a looped line. (R., p. 145, 110.) As testified to by 
Bremer's expert, Philip Hart, all water companies plan on looping lines when possible because 
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it equalizes pressure in the system and provides more flexibility, better service and better fire 
protection for its members. Thus, the fact that EGID looped the line at no cost to Bremer two 
and one-half years later does not create a material question of fact whether the Hayden A venue 
water main line extension was needed to extend water to Bremer' s building. 
Bremer notes in its appeal brief that Sappington's testimony reveals that the water main 
serving Bremer's property adjacent to McGuire Road could have been extended east across and 
through Bremer's property to serve the new manufacturing building. Exhibit B in this matter 
reveals that it is at least 664 feet from the edge of McGuire Road to the portion of the property 
where the facility was built. (R., p. 139.) It is at least another 329 feet to take the water main 
north to Hayden A venue for installation of the two hydrants required by the local fire 
district. (R., p. 139.) Bremer implies on appeal that this configuration across and through its 
parcel would have been better to properly served its needs for water. Bremer placed nothing in 
the record to suppo11 this contention. Thus, the trial court did not err by failing to find a 
question of fact whether the Hayden Avenue water main as designed by Bremer's engineer 
properly distributed water to Bremer's parcel. 
C. The District Court did not Abuse its Discretion by Denying Bremer's 
l.R.C.P. 60(b) .Motion 
Bremer claims the district court erred in denying its I.R.C.P. 60(b )(1) motion for relief 
from the court's judgment for reasons relating to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect. Bremer claims there were erroneous and misleading acts by the court or the opposing 
party because the trial court sua sponte raised the voluntary payment rule in hearing on 
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Bremer's motion for reconsideration. Bremer further claims the district court should have 
allowed the motion because EGID never argued Bremer voluntarily agreed to pay for the 
mainline extension, so Bremer did not focus on the negotiations surrounding the mainline 
The standard of review for a claim of error related to I.R.C.P. 60(b) was set forth in 
Printcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 283 P.3d 757, 765-766 
(2012), wherein this Com1 held: 
Id. 
A trial court's decision whether to grant relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b) is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. The decision will be upheld if it appears that 
the trial com1 (1) correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, (2) acted within 
the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the applicable legal 
standards, and (3) reached its determination through an exercise of reason. A 
determination under Rule 60(b) turns largely on questions of fact to be 
determined by the trial comi. Those factual findings will be upheld unless they 
are clearly erroneous. If the trial comi applies the facts in a logical manner to the 
criteria set forth in Rule 60(b ), while keeping in mind the policy favoring relief 
in doubtful cases, the court will be deemed to have acted within its discretion. 
Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 734, P.3d 998, 1001 (2010) (internal citations 
omitted). 
EGID agrees it never argued that Bremer had voluntarily agreed to pay EGID for the 
mainline extension, which was discussed previously in this brief. As previously set forth, 
EGID disagrees the district court sua sponte raised the issue at the reconsideration hearing. In 
its oral pronunciation of its decision at the motion to alter hearing, the district court reiterated 
its previous rulings. The court observed that the matter was initially pled as an illegal tax on 
the basis that EGID had no authority to require Bremer to construct improvements to obtain the 
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delivery of water. (Tr., Motion to Alter or Set Aside Judgment, p. 14, L. 12-21.) The district 
court confirmed that it found that LC. § 43-330(A) allowed EGID to require landowners to bear 
the costs of extensions of the irrigation system designed to improve the landowner's subdivided 
and improved parcel. The district court concluded that it had found there to be no genuine 
issues of material fact that the extension was an illegal tax. (Tr., Motion to Alter or Set Aside 
Judgment, p. 14, L. 22 - p. 15, L. 5.) The court reiterated it also found the parties entered into 
a lawful agreement for Bremer to construct the improvements. (Tr., Motion to Alter or Set 
Aside Judgment, p. 15, L. 6-8.) 
EGID disagrees with Bremer' s contention that EGID contributed to its failure to raise 
business compulsion as a defense due to the memorandum and affidavits if filed. Bremer 
claims these pleadings only gave it notice that EGID was claiming the constructed 
improvements provided for the proper delivery of water and the correct routing of the water 
main. EGID strongly disagrees the thrust of its arguments did not involve a claim that the 
parties reached an agreement. In fact, EGID specifically argued: 
In the event the land is subdivided land within the District, a contract 
may be entered into with the owner of the parcel proposed for development. 
Idaho Code § 43-330A provides "[w]hen a parcel of land lying within an 
irrigation district has been subdivided and the owner or owners of the entire 
parcel propose to develop that parcel or any of the tracts therein for residential, 
commercial, industrial or municipal use, the board of directors of the district 
may enter into a contract with the owner or owners of the entire parcel, or of any 
tract therein, for the construction of a pressurized system for the proper 
distribution of irrigation water to the parcel or to the designated tracts within the 
parcel." The agreement reached in this matter was that the applicant would 
be responsible for construction of the improvements to serve the parcel. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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(R. pp. 53-54.) Thus, Bremer's argument on appeal 1s founded upon an incorrect 
premise. 
To reiterate what has been argued at length previously, EGID never raised the voluntary 
payment rule. EGID maintained an agreement was reached between the parties which provided 
for Bremer to construct the improvements to serve the Bremer parcel in conformance with the 
engineered plans submitted by Bremer. 
Bremer initially claimed an extension to the irrigation district's system was not 
necessary to obtain water from EGID. At the motion for reconsideration, Bremer argued that 
there was a question of fact as to whether the improvements constructed by Bremer provided 
for the proper distribution of water. After the motion for reconsideration, Bremer again shifted 
its argument, claiming that the construction of improvements constituted a payment to EGID, 
and a question of fact regarding the coercion exception to the voluntary payment rule precluded 
summary judgment. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bremer's motion to alter or 
amend the judgment. The district court perceived the matter as one of discretion. (Tr., Motion 
to Alter, p. 15, LL 17-22.) It gave a reasoned decision why it was not granting the motion, 
stating that Bremer had not presented any new evidence which showed mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise or excusable neglect which allowed relief from the judgment. (Tr., Motion to Alter, p. 
16, L. 1-7) Therefore, the district court acted within the bounds of its discretion. Thus, the trial 
court did not commit error in denying the motion. Further, as noted above, the additional 
evidence would not have added any new information for the district court to consider. It 
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merely reiterated that Bremer's decision to construct the Hayden Avenue water main line 
improvements was driven by economic considerations. 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES 
Bremer argues on appeal it is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. By its 
terms, l.C. § 12-117 applies to a state agency or political subdivision. A political subdivision is 
defined as a city, a county, or any taxing district or a health district. LC. § 12-117(4)(b). An 
irrigation district has no power to tax its members. It may assess certain costs as allowed in 
Title 43, but it may not tax its members. Thus, an irrigation district is not included within the 
ambit of LC. § 12-117. Unlike a health district, an irrigation district is not specifically defined 
by this statute as a political subdivision. Thus, neither party may pursue attorney fees pursuant 
to this statute. 
EGID hereby requests attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-121. This Court in Stevenson 
v. Windermere Real Estate/Capital Group, Inc., 152 Idaho 824 275 P.3d 839, 843 (2012) held: 
Id. 
Attorney fees are only appropriate under LC. § 12-121 if the court finds "that 
the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation." LR.C.P. 54(e)(l). These circumstances do not exist" [i]fthere is a 
legitimate, triable issue of fact or a legitimate issue of law .... " Kiebert v. Goss, 
144 Idaho 225, 228-29, 159 P.3d 862, 865-66 (2007) (citing Thomas v. Madsen, 
142 Idaho 635, 639, 132 P.3d 392, 396 (2006)). 
In the present case, Bremer has taken the irrational position, following a request to EGID for 
delivery of water, that it did not need the water. Bremer has also taken the illogical position 
that, having provided the proposal for achieving delivery of water to its facility, the proposal 
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did not provide for the proper distribution of water. Bremer further complains that EGID did 
not consider an alternative route through the back of Bremer's property which violated EGID's 
policies and that Bremer did not propose. Thus, the appeal was frivolous. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Bremer' s real complaint in this matter is that EGID connected to the po1iion of water 
main Bremer constructed and looped the line for the benefit of all members of the irrigation 
district. Bremer did not sue EGID until this event occurred. It was not improper for EGID to 
require Bremer to build the water main extension to service Bremer's subdivided parcel. The 
mere fact that EGID looped the line a few years later to the benefit of the members of the 
district served by that particular main line later does not vitiate the fact that Bremer required the 
water main extension, both for delivery of water to his foam insulation manufacturing facility 
and later to support its application for a subdivision of Lot 2. The trial court did not err in 
granting summary judgment to EGID. 
Submitted this 14th day of January, 2013. 
JAMES, VERt'JON & WEEKS, P.A. 
Susan P. Weeks, !SB #4255 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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of record as follows: 
Arthur M. Bistline 
Bistline Law, PLLC 
1423 N. Government Way 
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